The union and non-union wage differential in the New Zealand public service by Feinberg-Danieli, Goldie & Lonti, Zsuzsanna
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 2
 2
00
6
27
The Union and Non-Union
Wage Differential in the New Zealand
Public Service
Goldie Feinberg-Danieli and Zsuzsanna Lonti
Introduction
What do unions do? The major objective of unions is
to improve the terms of conditions of employment for
their members. At the same time, unions have a
considerable impact on the employment conditions of
not only their own members but non-unionised workers
as well. One of the most important employment terms
unions negotiate is wages. As a result, wage bargaining
has been identified as a primary function of unions, and
differences in wages between union and non-union
members are considered an important measure of union
power. In most countries this differential is called the
‘union/non-union’ wage differential. In New Zealand,
however, there are employees who are union members
but are not covered by collective agreements, contrary
to the more common occurrence in other countries (e.g.
the United States and Canada), where non-union
members are often covered by collective agreements.
Therefore, in New Zealand the differential should be
more precisely called the ‘collective versus individual’
wage differential. In this article we focus on the raw
‘collective’ wage differential, but due to convention we
still call it the ‘union’ wage differential.
There is a large body of empirical research internationally
on the union/non-union wage differential, using both
micro- and macroeconomic models. Those studies
almost uniformly conclude that union members receive
higher wages then their non-union counterparts. We
explore whether this is the case in the New Zealand
Public Service (NZPS) as well.
Due to data limitations the union premium has not
previously been calculated in New Zealand. The New
Zealand State Services Commission’s (SSC) Human
Resource Capability (HRC) survey - the only available
source of individual-level data in New Zealand on
collective agreement coverage and union membership -
allows us to examine the differences in average wages
between NZPS employees who are employed on
individual agreements and those employed on collective
agreements. The HRC survey of 20051 collects a wide
range of information on people employed in the NZPS,
including all permanent and temporary employees, at
the same time excluding those who work on a casual or
as-required basis, and chief executives. The data was
collected by the SSC from all 35 public service
departments, which employed approximately 40,000
full-time and part-time employees in 2005. Of those
employees, 54% were covered by collective agreements
and 58% of them were union members.
We find that in the NZPS, employees on individual
contracts earn significantly higher wages then those who
are covered by collective agreements, contrary to the
experience of other countries. Looking for the factors
contributing to this phenomenon, we carry out
comparisons of average wages of employees on
individual versus collective agreements by gender,
employment type, occupation, ethnicity, age, tenure and
employer size. The negative union wage differential
persists across most employee subgroups. We also
provide some preliminary explanations for our unusual
findings, although without carrying out further
empirical work the reasons for the existence of the
negative union wage premium cannot be ascertained.
Brief history of employment relations
in the NZPS
A brief overview of employment relations, and specifically
the role of unions, in the NZPS since the mid-late 1980s,
when major restructuring of the service started, is essential
in order to understand the climate that NZPS employers,
unions and employees operate in today.
1 The 2005 survey reflects the New Zealand Public Service as of 30
June 2005. We would like to thank the State Services Commission
for allowing us access to the data.
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Prior to 1988, employment relations in the service were
centralised. The SSC acted as the government’s central
employing agency of staff, negotiating and monitoring
their employment conditions. NZPS employee
organisations were allowed to register as trade unions
for the first time under the Labour Relations Act 1987.
These registered unions enjoyed the exclusive right to
represent the group or groups of workers defined in the
union’s membership rules in negotiations for an award
or agreement (Walsh et al., 2001). Public sector unions
enjoyed a high level of membership.
The process of decentralisation in the service had begun
with the State Services Act of 1988. Under this act, chief
executives became employers of their staff, and
occupational bargaining was replaced with
departmental-level agreements as the primary means of
pay fixing, an arrangement that continues to this date.
Management positions, at all levels, were removed from
collective bargaining coverage, which was replaced by
fixed-term individual contracts.
Further major changes occurred in the industrial relations
environment in New Zealand, including its public service,
with the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act
(ECA) in 1991. The ECA showed an explicit preference
for individual contracts over collective bargaining in
establishing conditions of work. Discrimination on the
grounds of membership or non-membership of a union
was prohibited. Unions were not considered different
from any other non-trading body corporate; union
membership was voluntary and employees could authorise
any bargaining agent to negotiate individual or collective
contracts. This resulted in a dramatic decline in union
density2 across all industries. While in 1991 union density
was 42.3%, by 1999 it had declined to 17.5%; however,
the decline in union density was smallest in the public
and community services. Public servants were encouraged
to leave collective contracts in favour of individual
contracts, which led to a considerable reduction in union
membership and to sizeable wage differentials between
the more senior, highly-skilled public servants and those
in the lower paid occupations. Furthermore, where a
collective contract was in place employers often extended
the same conditions to non-union employees, creating
fertile ground for ‘free-riding’ (Harbridge and
Honeybone, 1996). Unions, including public service
unions, became weak and deeply compromised (Walsh
et al., 2001).
The employment relations climate changed again with
the introduction of the Employment Relations Act
2000, which gives unions a monopoly over collective
bargaining, promotes the concept of ‘good faith’
bargaining and supports multi-employer bargaining.
However, bargaining is still completely decentralised in
the NZPS, where there is exclusively single-employer
bargaining. Still, each department has full control over
the determination of wages and other conditions for
their staff. At the same time, departments are advised
by the SSC to avoid setting precedents or implementing
proposals that have a likelihood of ‘flow on’ to other
parts of the service.
The size and determinants of the union
wage differential in other countries
Collective bargaining is the most important tool
unions use in New Zealand to achieve gains for their
members. Wage bargaining is identified as a primary
function of unions. However, unions have a
considerable impact on the rewards of not only their
own members but non-unionised workers as well.
Unions often play a significant role in improving
minimum standards for all employees and set a pay
standard that non-union employers often follow; this
is called the ‘union spillover effect’.
It is well established internationally that unions generally
obtain higher wages for union members, creating a
‘union premium’ that often non-members receive as well
(e.g. Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Belman and Voos,
2004). However, Peetz (2001) finds that Australian
employees on individual contracts often experience
superior terms and conditions to those of employees on
collective agreements, so in fact having a ‘non-union
premium’. He argues that employers may offer
employees a higher wage through individual contracts
than is available through collective bargaining for the
same type of work in order to induce employees to
forsake union coverage. This impact of the unions is
called the ‘union threat effect’ and has been identified
in other jurisdictions as well.
Union/non-union wage differentials were estimated for
several countries, and a number of factors were also
2 Union density equals union membership divided by total employed
labour force.
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identified that explain the size of the gap. Economists
differentiate between ‘gross (or raw) wage differential’
and the ‘adjusted (net) wage differential’, being the
differential when differences in various individual and
workplace characteristics are adjusted for. These
adjustments usually reduce the raw differential
substantially.
The magnitude of the union wage premium varies from
country to country. Due to data constraints, the union
wage premium has not been calculated in New Zealand.
For Australia, the most recent study puts the net union/
non-union wage differential at between 1% and 6%
(Wooden, 2001), using various assumptions for union
activities. In the US the net union wage premium has
been estimated in the range of 15-20% (Blanchflower
and Bryson, 2004). In the UK the net union wage
premium amounts to around 5% (Metcalf et al., 2001).
In Canada most recent estimates put the gross union
wage differential at 14% and the net, adjusted
differential at 7% (Fang and Verma, 2002).
In the literature, both employee characteristics - such
as age, tenure, occupation, race, sex, education, skill-
level and marital status – and industry and firm
characteristics – e.g. firm size, geographic location, firm-
level bargaining – were found to have an impact on the
size of the union wage premium. Freeman and Medoff
(1984) established that in the US the union wage
differential was largest for the youngest, low-tenured
and lowest paid workers, and smallest for prime-aged,
long-tenured and the highest paid employees. The union
wage effect was also larger for non-whites than for
whites, for blue-collar workers than for white-collar
workers, and for males compared to females. However,
the union wage differential fell with firm-level contracts
(decentralised bargaining, for example, having a negative
effect) and the size of the work site.
An almost universal finding is that union/non-union
wage differentials are larger for lower-skilled than for
higher-skilled workers (e.g. Freeman, 1982; Mishel and
Walters, 2003). Only one study (Hirsch and
Schumacher, 2001) has concluded that union wage
effects are highly similar across workers with different
levels of skills.
Hansen (1998), focusing on the US, found that the
union/non-union earnings ratio was greater for women
than for men and for blacks and Hispanics than for
whites. In a recent study, Blanchflower and Bryson
(2004), who updated Freeman and Medoff ’s earlier,
1984 study, conclude that in the US, variation in the
industry-level union wage premium remained; that the
state-level union premium varied less than the
occupation- and industry-level premium; and that union
workers remained better able than non-union workers
to resist employer efforts to reduce wages when market
conditions were unfavourable.
Findings are somewhat contradictory on the impact of
union density on the size of the union wage premium.
Card (2001) finds that, in spite of falling union density
in the US, union/non-union wage differentials from
1973 to 1993 have been largely unchanged. At the same
time, Bellman and Voos (2004) argue that falling union
density in the US from 1979 to 1996 has been
accompanied by a decline in the union wage premium.
Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) suggest that the
relationship between union density and union wages
depends on the level of density. They argue that a strong
effect would be achieved when density is higher than
40%. Wooden (2001) has also shown that in Australia,
strong union presence – where the majority of workers
are covered by collective agreements – confers a wage
advantage in the order of 15-17%, which applies to
members and non-members alike. Peetz (2001) has
pointed out that in voluntarist regimes collective
bargaining is strengthened when union density is higher;
but while it is possible in many regimes to have union
members who are not covered by collective bargaining,
in such circumstances unions are largely ineffective in
achieving gains for their members. In more recent
research, Waddoups (2005) suggests that where union
density is high it is likely that the provisions of negotiated
collective agreements will extend to similar, non-
unionised employees. In his findings not only do
workers receive a premium for union membership, but
the union premium is higher in a high-density industry.
We came across only a few studies focusing on the union
wage premium in the public sector. There seems to be a
consensus in the US and Canadian literature that the
union differential is lower in the public sector, and, more
specifically, in central government, than in the private
sector (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Bender, 1998).
However, Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) found that
the public sector wage premium was similar to those in
the private sector. Kornfeld’s 1993 study of Australian
union wage premiums finds that the union premium
exists primarily in the private sector, and he concludes
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that public sector unions in Australia tend to raise wages
for all employees in the public sector.
In summary, the literature shows that in most instances
union workers receive higher pay than comparable non-
union workers, with the size of the premium varying
over time and across countries. The following factors
have been identified in contributing to the size of union/
non-union wage differential: union density, collective
bargaining coverage, size of establishment, industry,
region, age, gender, race, occupation, education, term
of agreement, ethnicity, marital status, and tenure with
current employer and in a given occupation.
Analysis: what is happening in the
NZPS?
Our analysis is based on the SSC’s 2005 HRC survey
data. In the survey, wages are defined as the annual full-
time base salary as of 30 June 2005. From the
explanatory variables that had been identified in the
literature we were able to compare the average wages
for employees on individual versus collective agreements
by gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, term of
employment, hours of work, the union the employees
belong to, tenure and the size of the employer.3
Table 1 contains the basic descriptives for the variables
that our research focuses on. It shows that the NZPS
employed 40,325 employees in 2005. Of these, 59% of
the workforce are female, and 54% are employed on
collective agreements, while 58% are union members.
Almost 60% of the employees are New Zealand
European and 16% are Maori. Ninety per cent of the
workforce are permanent employees and work full time.
Most NZPS employees work for large organisations with
500 or more employees. The largest occupational group
is associate professionals (34.6%), followed by
professionals (29.2%). Clerks constitute 17.5% of the
workforce, while corporate managers represent almost
10%. The bulk of the employees are in the 30-50 age
group. Surprisingly, almost 21% of the workforce have
less than one year’s experience with their department
and 28% have only one to three years’ experience. This
means that almost half of the NZPS employees have
quite limited experience with their department, while
fewer than 30% have more than 10 years’ experience.
However, as employees often move across departments,
people might have more experience within the service.
Slightly more women (55%) are employed on collective
agreements then men (53%), while only 16% of the
employees on fixed-term contracts are on collectives.
Seven per cent of union members are on individual
contracts; 55% of full-time employees and 42% of part-
time employees are on collectives. The unionisation rate
for Pakeha (53.6%) is quite similar to the overall
unionisation rate of the public service workforce
(54.3%), while Maori are somewhat more highly
organised (61.3%). The Public Service Association
(PSA) is the largest union in the sector, representing
76% of union members. There are a few other unions
that operate in some departments and compete with
the PSA, such as the National Union of Public
Employees and Taxpro. A small proportion of employees
are members of other unions, for example the Central
Amalgamated Workers’ Union, Finsec (the country’s
financial sector union) and the New Zealand
Educational Institute.
Unionisation seems to be positively related to employer
size: the larger the employer, the higher the ratio of
employees on collective agreements. There seems to be
a strong association between age and being on
collectives, as well as between tenure and unionisation.
This means that the older a person is, the more likely it
is that he or she will be on a collective. The same applies
to tenure: the more tenure a person has, the more likely
he or she will be unionised. From the various
occupations, the ‘other workers’ group, which contains
mainly tradespeople, is the most highly organised
(73.8%), followed by associate professionals (66%) and
clerks (63.8%); 42% of professionals are on collective
agreements. Corporate managers are the group least
organised, with one in five corporate managers on
collectives. This is still considered a high ratio
considering the concerted efforts by various
governments to push corporate managers onto
individual contracts since the inception of state sector
3 Ethnicity categories include: New Zealand Maori; New Zealand
European; Pacific Island; Asian; other European; and Other.
‘Occupation’ is based on the New Zealand Standard Classification
of Occupation at the two-digit level. However, we created more
aggregate occupational categories, as follows: legislative and
administrative workers; corporate managers; professionals;
associate professionals; clerks; and all other workers. ‘Term of
employment’ includes two categories: (1) fixed – limited (contract/
agreement with a specified end date) and (2) open (permanent
employee). ‘Hours of work’ differentiates between full-time
employees with more than 30 hours per week and part-time
employees with less than 30 hours per week. ‘Tenure’ is employment
with a department.
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reforms in the late 1980s. Differences in unionisation
rates between the various occupational groups might
also reflect a negative relationship between job
responsibilities and being on a collective. In sum, these
results point to significant compositional differences
between unionised and non-unionised workers - by age,
tenure, occupation, full-time/part-time status and
employer size – that could explain part of the wage gap.
Table 2 compares mean wages for employees on
collective and individual agreements by gender,
agreement term, union membership, hours of work,
employer size, occupation, age, tenure and ethnicity.
In contrast to most of the findings of the international
literature, but in line with a relatively recent Australian
study (Peetz, 2001), we have found that a substantial
negative union premium exists in the NZPS. On
average, NZPS employees on collective agreements
earn 23% less than those employed on individual
contracts. Only in the case of part-time employees do
those on collective agreements earn more than those
on individual contracts – the union premium for them
is 5% – and employees in the occupational group ‘other
workers’ – which covers mainly blue-collar workers –
earn roughly the same irrespective of whether they are
employed on collective or individual agreements.
Further, looking at the data by occupation, the
differential is largest for diplomats (-50%), followed
by corporate managers, where those on collectives earn
30% less than managers on individual contracts. There
is a substantial negative differential (-10%) for
professionals, and there is a small (-3%) differential
for both associate professionals and clerks. In the white-
collar occupations the size of the differential seems to
be related to the amount of responsibility required for
the job. This is in line with the findings of Peetz (2001),
who similarly found that in Australia employees on
individual contracts earn more than those on
collectives, and linked this to occupational differences.
Many previous studies also show larger union gains
for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers
(Card, 2001; Mishel and Walters, 2003), and this is
substantiated in the NZPS data as well.
Our results seem also to be in line with the literature’s
finding that the union/non-union wage differentials are
larger for lower-skilled than for higher-skilled workers
(Freeman, 1982; Mishel and Walters, 2003). The twist
in the NZPS results is that lower-skilled people on
collectives still earn less than their colleagues on
individual contracts, but the negative differential is
smaller for the lower-skilled occupational groups than
for the higher-skilled ones. At the same time, union
density might also be related to the size of the union/
non-union wage differentials by occupation; like ‘other
workers’, associate professionals and clerks are all highly
unionised.
In terms of gender, males on collective agreements earn
30% less than males on individual contracts, while for
females the negative union differential in smaller: -17%.
This is in line with the findings of the international
literature that unions provide greater gains for females
than for males (Hansen, 1998). In the absence of
multivariate analysis we could only speculate about the
reasons for the significant difference in the differential
by gender. One contributing factor might be
occupational differences across the genders: females
congregating in lower paid occupations while males
more typically hold more senior and managerial
positions, which command higher salaries. At the same
time, senior and managerial employees are more likely
to be employed on individual contracts.
Turning to employer size, the smaller the organisation,
the larger the negative union premium. In organisations
with fewer than 100 workers, employees on collective
agreements earn 33% less than employees on individual
agreements, while in organisations with over 500
employees workers on individual agreements earn 21%
more then their counterparts on collectives. This might
be related to union representation, as smaller organisations
have much lower union density than larger ones.
Looking at the size of the differential by age, it has been
established in the literature that the union wage effect
is largest for the youngest workers and smallest for
prime-aged workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Our
findings are consistent with those results. Although in
the NZPS a negative union wage differential exists for
all age groups, it is smallest for those 25 years of age or
younger (-2.4%), and steadily increases until the 51-55
age group (-34%), then slowly declines to -25% for those
aged over 61. The same pattern is followed with tenure,
although the differences between the various groups are
less pronounced: people with less than one year of tenure
on collectives earn 20% less than people with more than
20 years of service, who earn 36% less on collectives
than on individual contracts.
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By term of agreement, open-term employees on
collective agreements earn 26% less than their
counterparts on individual contracts. In comparison,
employees on fixed-term agreements who are covered
by collective contracts earn 19% less than employees
on collectives.
Finally, by ethnicity, our literature review shows that
the union/non-union earnings ratio in the US was
greater for blacks and Hispanics than for whites,
meaning that unions provide more gains for groups that
are traditionally disadvantaged in the labour market
(Hansen, 1998). We concur with those findings,
although a negative union premium still exists for both
Pakeha and Maori in the NZPS. However, the gap is
wider for Pakeha (-25%) than it is for Maori (-18%).
Conclusion
We set out to compare the wages of NZPS employees
on collective versus individual agreements. We calculated
the raw average collective/individual wage differential
and compared the differentials for major subgroups of
employees. Contrary to the general findings in the
international literature, employees on collective
agreements in the NZPS earn substantially less than
employees on individual contracts. The negative wage
differential persists across most employee subgroups.
However, New Zealand public sector unions seem to
deliver better results for part-timers, blue-collar workers,
young workers and lower-skilled white-collar workers,
groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in the labour
market. Alternatively, the relatively little bargaining
power these employee group members have individually
could be reflected in the differentials.
Our results show that, in spite of the relatively high
unionisation rates in the NZPS, unions in this sector
are not able to deliver higher wages to their members
than employees on individual contracts can negotiate
for themselves. Our work is only the first step in
documenting the union/non-union wage differential in
the New Zealand public service. We plan to carry out
multivariate analysis, including decomposing the raw
union/non-union wage gap, which will allow us to
separate out the impact of compositional differences
between union and non-union members on the wage
differential from the impact of unions. In the meantime,
we could only speculate on the reasons for the
unexpected findings.
Most unions in the public sector were established
relatively recently (since 1987), and under the award
system public sector employees and their associations
had enjoyed a sheltered existence. It is most likely that
the decentralisation of collective bargaining to the
departmental level, combined with prolonged budget
constraints imposed on departments by successive
governments, contributed as much to the loss of
bargaining power of public sector unions as did the
decidedly anti-union stance of the Employment
Contracts Act. The ECA did weaken unions, and most
unions were not ready and did not have the time to
develop tools to deal with the drastic changes. While
public sector unions were more successful than other
New Zealand unions in keeping members, their
declining union power might be reflected in the wage
outcomes of their negotiations. During the ECA period,
many public sector unions were not able to negotiate
wages as part of collective bargaining. Even in 2003,
around 50% of the public sector collective agreements
did not include wages. At the same time, it has been
well established (Walsh et al., 2001) that the drastic
changes in the economic and employment relations
environment from 1987 created increased income
inequalities in New Zealand society, providing higher
returns for highly educated professionals and declining
real incomes for lower-skilled employees. This general
tendency could be reflected in the stronger bargaining
position of professionals and managerial employees on
individual contracts in the NZPS.
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Table 1: Individual, job and workplace characteristics of the NZPS (2005)
Employees Collective Individual
No. of employees 40,325 21,879 18, 446
Women 23,843 13,107 10,735
Men 16,480 8,772 7,708
Open-term 36,612 21,281 15,331
Fixed-term 3,713 598 3,115
Union member 23, 281 21,653 1,628
PSA 17,664 16,367 1,297
Full-time 36,733 20,357 16,376
Part-time 3,592 1,522 2,070
Employer size (ees):
≤ 100 339 47 292
101-500 3,130 1,008 2,122
501+ 36,856 20,824 16,032
Occupation:
Corporate managers 3,89 763 3,132
Professionals 11,779 4,976 6,803
Associate profs 13,960 9,206 4,754
Clerks 7,047 4,497 2,550
Legislative and admin. 110 2 83
Other workers 3,078 2,272 806
Age:
≤ 25 3,285 1,551 1,734
26-30 4,323 2,051 2,272
31-35 5,061 2,540 2,521
36-40 5,573 2,969 2,604
41-45 6,230 3,483 2,747
46-50 5,568 3.231 2,337
51-55 4,412 2,626 1,786
56-60 3,218 1,995 1,223
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≥ 61 1,873 1,210 663
Tenure (years):
0 8,353 2,736 5,617
1-3 11,448 5,529 5,919
4-5 4,556 2,656 1,900
6-9 4,888 2,928 1,960
10-19 7,278 5,357 1,921
20+ 3,801 2,673 1,128
Ethnicity:
Pakeha 23,446 12,578 10,868
Maori 6,252 3,831 2,421
Table 2: Comparison of mean wages and the collective/individual wage differential
All ($) Collective ($) Individual ($) Wage
Differential (%)
Total 50,884 44,569 58,376 -0.24
Women 47,103 43,193 51,878 -0.17
Men 56,349 46,624 67,416 -0.31
Open -term 51,430 44,749 60,705 -0.26
Fixed- term 45,001 38,154 46,911 -0.19
Union member 45,699 44,537 61,155 -0.27
PSA 45,206 43,962 60,904 -0.28
Full-time 52,067 44,911 60,962 -0.26
Part-time 38,791 39,986 37,911 0.05
Employer size (ees):
≤100 88,213 61,237 92,555 -0.34
101-500 66,250 54,111 72,016 -0.25
501+ 49,236 44,069 55,948 -0.21
Occupation:
Corporate managers 84,676 58,354 91,089 -0.36
Professionals 58,988 55,156 61,790 -0.11
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Associate profs 41,889 41,333 42,965 -0.04
Clerks 38,744 38,1 39,756 -0.04
Legislative & admin. 170,506 95,839 194,796 -0.51
Other workers 41,599 41,730 41,232 0.01
Age:
≤ 25 35,369 34,928 35,763 -0.024
26-30 43,011 39,766 45,940 -0.13
31-35 48,770 43,512 54,067 -0.20
36-40 51,867 44,643 60,104 -0.26
41-45 53,691 45,933 63,526 -0.28
46-50 55,687 46,922 67,806 -0.31
51-55 57,728 47,681 72,501 -0.34
56-60 56,700 47,853 71,132 -0.33
≥ 61 50,910 45,442 60,892 -0.25
Tenure (years):
 0 44,811 37,305 48,467 -0.23
1-3 48,450 41,254 55,190 -0.25
4-5 51,494 43,894 62,120 -0.30
6-9 54,499 45,759 67,555 -0.32
10-19 53,780 47,748 70,560 -0.32
20+ 60,612 51,856 81,363 -0.37
Ethnicity:
Pakeha 52,578 45,453 60,825 -0.25
Maori 45,400 41,803 51,094 -0.18
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